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I. INTRODUCTION

On a Sunday morning, the average American might hope to
enjoy any number of activities: attending a church service, drinking a
mimosa with brunch, shopping for clothes at the mall, looking for a
new car, or hunting with friends. However, in a surprisingly large
number of states, only one of these activities would be legal: going to
church.
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Such is the result of blue laws,' the colloquial term for state
statutes that regulate or prohibit entertainment and commercial
activities on Sundays or religious holidays. 2 Originating in England,
blue laws were enacted throughout colonial America in an effort to
protect the Christian Sabbath as mandated by the Fourth
Commandment. 3 Despite centuries of change and secularization,
Sunday restrictions have not only survived, they have thrived,
remaining in effect in a majority of states even today. 4
This prominence, however, does not equal validity. To the
as
laws frequently have been challenged
contrary, blue
unconstitutional establishments of religion in violation of the First
Amendment, 5 most notably in the 1961 case of McGowan v.
Maryland.6 Although the Supreme Court has acknowledged the
overtly religious origins of blue laws, it has chosen nevertheless to
uphold them as advancing the secular purpose of creating a uniform
day of rest. 7 Despite this conclusion, changes in both the Supreme
Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence and modern blue laws
themselves suggest the Court would reach a very different result if a
similar challenge were brought today.
Part II of this Note outlines the history of blue laws and
provides an overview of their current status, specifically exploring the
most frequently restricted activities. Part III examines the Supreme

1.

Sunday restrictions were first called "blue laws" during the colonial period. DAVID N.

LABAND & DEBORAH HENDRY HEINBUCH, BLUE LAWS: THE HISTORY, ECONOMICS, AND POLITICS

OF SUNDAY-CLOSING LAWS 8 (1987). Some commentators assert that the term derives from the
1665 laws of the New Haven Colony, which were printed on blue paper. Id. However, other
commentators argue that the term originates from the expression "true blue," a derogatory term
for the Puritans that referred to their constant virtue and the strictness of their convictions. Id.
2.
See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 183 (8th ed. 2004) (defining blue laws as "statute[s]
regulating or prohibiting commercial activity on Sundays"); LABAND & HEINBUCH, supra note 1,
at 3 (describing blue laws as "laws that prohibit or restrict individuals from engaging in certain
acts on Sunday"). Blue laws are also frequently referred to as "Sunday restrictions," "Sunday
closing laws," or "Sunday statutes" and will be called such throughout this note. Id.
See McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 431 (1961) (explaining that blue laws "go far
3.
back into American history, having been brought to the colonies with a background of English
legislation dating to the thirteenth century"). The Fourth Commandment states:
Remember to observe the Sabbath day by keeping it holy. Six days a week are set apart
for your daily duties and regular work, but the seventh day is a day of rest dedicated to
the Lord your God. On that day no one in your household may do any kind of work.
Exodus 20:8-10.
4.
LABAND & HEINBUCH, supra note 1, at 48. Although Laband and Heinbuch originally
made this observation in 1985, research performed in early 2006 and outlined infra in Part II.B
proves their statement remains accurate today.
The Establishment Clause provides that "Congress shall make no law respecting an
5.
establishment of religion." U.S. CONST. amend. I.
McGowan, 366 U.S. at 420.
6.
7.
Id. at 431, 452.
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Court's treatment of individual cases addressing blue laws and
provides a summary of the Court's somewhat complicated
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, attempting to extract unifying
principles under which the constitutionality of governmental actions
can be tested. Part IV applies the principles derived in Part III to
are
modern blue laws, concluding that such restrictions
unconstitutional establishments of religion. Moreover, particular
attention is paid to the role played by special interest groups in
obtaining blue law exceptions and the effect of their influence on the
Court's analysis in McGowan. Finally, Part V offers concluding
thoughts and suggests an alternative method for providing a day of
rest which would pose none of the constitutional problems created by
Sunday restrictions.

II. SOMETHING BORROWED, SOMETHING KEPT: AN OVERVIEW OF
AMERICAN BLUE LAWS

A. History of Blue Laws
Despite their prominence in the United States, blue laws are
far from a uniquely American invention. In 321 A.D., Constantine
passed the first Sunday restriction requiring that "all judges ... city
people and ...tradesmen rest upon the venerable day of the sun," the
pagan term for Sunday." This earliest blue law and others of similar
character suggest that well before Christianity recognized Sunday as
its Sabbath, pagans set it apart as a day of rest.9 However, as
Christianity's influence grew, pagan Sunday restrictions were
replaced with those meant to fulfill the Christian objective of keeping
the Sabbath holy. In fact, as early as 386 A.D., blue laws began to
refer expressly to Sunday as "the Lord's day."'10 From then until well
into the seventeenth century, Sunday restrictions were enacted
These laws
throughout England for solely Christian purposes.'

8.
LABAND & HEINBUCH, supra note 1, at 9 (quoting Code Just. 3.12.3 (Constantine/321)).
Id. at 8-9.
9.
10. Id. at 9-10 (quoting a proclamation from emperors Gratianus, Valentinianus, and
Theodosius stating that "on the day of the sun, properly called the Lord's day" there should be no
lawsuits, business, indictments, or debt collection, as such activities would violate "an institute
and rite of holy religion").
11. See McGowan, 366 U.S. at 433 (finding that early "English Sunday legislation was in
aid of the established church"); LABAND & HEINBUCH, supra note 1, at 10-29 (listing English
Sabbath legislation passed between the fifth and seventeenth centuries). Blue laws were passed
throughout England until as recently as 1950, with many remaining in effect today. Id. at 208.
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banned a variety of activities, including attending market, playing
12
games, and engaging in "bodily labor."
As British colonists settled America, they enacted their own
versions of the English blue laws, the first of which was passed by the
Colony of Virginia in 1610.13 It declared that "[e]very man and woman
shall repair in the morning to the divine service and sermons
preached upon the Sabbath day, and in the afternoon to divine service,
and catechising." 14 A colonist's first violation was punishable by the
garnishment of a week's provisions and allowance, the second by
garnishment and whipping, and the third by death. 15 Fortunately,
such extreme punishment was rare. 16 However, blue laws in colonial
America were both widespread and frequently enforced, most
commonly through the levying of substantial fines. 17 For instance, in
the Plymouth, Massachusetts Bay, Connecticut, and New Haven
colonies residents could not travel unnecessarily, engage in sports, or
sell alcoholic beverages on Sunday.' 8 Maryland forbade Sunday
"gaming, fishing, fowling, [and] hunting," while New York added
horseracing and the "frequenting of tippling-houses" to its list of
prohibitions. 19 These and other colonial blue laws were based
primarily on an English Sunday restriction passed in 1677 by Charles
II, stating, "[f]or the better observation and keeping holy the Lord's
day, commonly called Sunday... all and every person.., shall upon
every Lord's day apply themselves to the observation of the same, by
exercising themselves thereon in the duties of piety and true
religion." 20 All were forbidden from "exercis[ing] any worldly labor or
business or work of their ordinary calling," or "expos[ing] for sale any
'2 1
wares, merchandise, fruit, herbs, goods, or chattels.

12. See McGowan, 366 U.S. at 431-32 (describing Sunday restrictions passed from 1237 to
the mid-seventeenth century by a variety of English rulers).
13.

LABAND & HEINBUCH, supra note 1, at 30.

14.

Id.

15.

Id.

16.

See WARREN L. JOHNS, DATELINE SUNDAY, U.S.A.: THE STORY OF THREE AND A HALF

CENTURIES OF SUNDAY-LAW BATTLES IN AMERICA 6 (1967) (stating that most colonial blue laws
were not punishable by death).
17. LABAND & HEINBUCH, supra note 1, at 38-39. Enforcement was so common that even
newly elected President George Washington was stopped when traveling from Connecticut to
New York for violating Connecticut's ban on Sunday travel. Id. at 38.
18. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 433 (1961).
19.

LABAND & HEINBUCH, supra note 1, at 33-34.

20. McGowan, 366 U.S. at 432 (quoting The Sunday Observance Act, 1677, 29 Car. 2, c. 7
(Eng.)).
21. Id. (emphasis omitted).

2007]

MODERN SUNDAY CLOSING LAWS

1277

Colonial blue laws survived the American Revolution and the
enactment of the First Amendment relatively unscathed. 22 Despite
having themselves adopted constitutions that prohibited government
establishment of religion, most new states reenacted their colonial
Sunday restrictions, 23 abandoning only provisions like that of Virginia
requiring church attendance. 24 These "new" blue laws continued the
colonial tradition of prohibiting all Sunday labor, business, and
worldly amusements, 25 although most states added exemptions for
works of necessity and charity.26 Initially, states did not stringently
enforce their blue laws. 27 However, the increasingly religious attitude
of Americans in the early nineteenth century revitalized blue law
enforcement and resulted in several significant developments,
including efforts to ban Sunday mail delivery and further restrict
Sunday alcohol consumption. 28 Blue laws were updated further in the
early twentieth century when many states extended their list of
prohibited worldly amusements to include activities as diverse as
29
baseball, theater, cockfighting, and fiddling.
B. Blue Laws Today
Throughout the twentieth century, American culture grew
significantly more secular and the demands of business more extreme.
However, blue laws have remained constant, even receiving validation
from the Supreme Court in the landmark 1961 case of McGowan v.
Maryland.30 In recent years, several states have attempted to
"modernize" their blue laws, increasing the number of activities
exempted from their bans or repealing broad prohibitions. Some states
have even entirely eliminated all non-alcohol related restrictions. 3 1
Unfortunately, this encouraging trend has not led to the end of blue
22.
23.
(2000).

Id.
Andrew J. King, Sunday Law in the Nineteenth Century, 64 ALB. L. REV. 675, 683

24.

McGowan, 366 U.S. at 434.

25.

JOHNS, supra note 16, at 60.

26.

King, supra note 23, at 683-84.

27.

Id. at 684.

28. See id. at 684-85 (describing the campaign of Protestant ministers to overturn federal
legislation allowing Sunday mail delivery and the temperance movement's focus on Sunday in
the nineteenth century). Efforts to eliminate Sunday mail delivery succeeded in 1912. JOHNS,
supra note 16, at 77.
29. See JOHNS, supra note 16, at 64-65 (describing typical Sunday laws in the 1930's and
1940's).

30. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961). See discussion infra Part 1II.A.
31. Alaska, Arizona, California, Florida, Hawaii, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada, New Mexico,
Oregon, South Dakota, Utah, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming have eliminated all nonalcohol related blue laws.
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laws. Today, the majority of states still retain some type of Sunday
closing law. 32 These statutes come in many forms, including both
"general" and "specific" provisions.
"General" blue laws resemble traditional Sunday restrictions in
their broad prohibition of all labor and business. However, unlike
their colonial predecessors, modern general blue laws frequently
exempt a laundry list of activities from their sweeping bans. 33 Today,
at least nine states maintain such restrictions. 34 Alternatively, some
states choose not to employ the broad language of a general Sunday
restriction but achieve almost the same result by individually
prohibiting the sale of virtually every item that would otherwise fall
under a general ban. 35 Still other states maintain more limited
general restrictions, choosing to prohibit a broad range of activities
but only for a portion of Sunday instead of the entire twenty-four-hour
36
period.

32. LABAND & HEINBUCH, supra note 1, at 48. Although Laband and Heinbuch based their
observation on data from 1985, research performed in early 2006 and outlined in this section
suggests their statement remains accurate today. Id. at 47.
33. See discussion infra Part IV.A.1.
34. See ALA. CODE §§ 13A-12-1 to 13A-12-2 (2006) (prohibiting any person from compelling
another to "perform any labor on Sunday, except the customary domestic duties of daily
necessity or comfort, or works of charity" or opening "[a]ny place where people assemble for the
purchase and sale of goods, wares and merchandise, [or] provisions"); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53302a (2007) (stating that "[n]o person, firm or corporation shall engage in work, labor or
business ... on Sunday); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 436.160 (West 2006) (providing that "[a]ny
person who works on Sunday ...in labor or other business, whether for profit or amusement...
shall be fined"); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 3204 (2006) (stating that "[a] person may not keep
a place of business open to the public" on Sunday unless for "works of necessity, emergency, or
charity"); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 136, § 5 (2007) (providing that "[w]hoever on Sunday keeps open
his shop, warehouse, factory or other place of business, or sells foodstuffs, goods, wares,
merchandise or real estate, or does any manner of labor, business or work, except works of
necessity and charity, shall be punished by a fine"); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 332-D:1 to D:2 (2006)
(stating that "[nlo person shall do any work, business, or labor of his secular calling ... on the
first day of the week, commonly called the Lord's Day" or "keep his shop, warehouse, cellar,
restaurant or workshop open"); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 5 (McKinney 2007) (prohibiting "[a]ll labor
on Sunday" except "works of necessity and charity"); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 908 (West 2006)
(forbidding "[s]ervile labor, except works of necessity or charity" and "[a]ll manner of public
selling ... of any commodities"); W. VA. CODE § 61-10-25 (2007) (making it unlawful "for any
person to engage in work, labor or business" on Sunday "except in household or other work of
necessity or charity").
35. See Mo. ANN. STAT. § 578.100 (West 2006) (prohibiting retail sale of motor vehicles,
clothing, furniture, house wares, office supplies, appliances, hardware, tools, paints, building
supplies, jewelry, silverware, watches, clocks, luggage, instruments, and musical recordings).
36. See N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-30-01 to 12.1-30-02 (2005) (making it a misdemeanor to
"conduct business or labor for profit" or sale or rent a specific list of items before noon on
Sunday); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 53-1-5, 53-1-40, 53-1-60 (2006) (deeming it "unlawful for any person
to engage in worldly work, labor, business of his ordinary calling or the selling ... to the
consumer any goods, wares or merchandise, excepting work of necessity or charity" before onethirty p.m. on Sundays).

2007]

MODERN SUNDAY CLOSING LAWS

1279

Outside of a general ban, many states target specific activities
as uniquely worthy of Sunday restriction. For example, six states limit
Sunday horseracing, 37 although only two restrict the racing of motor
vehicles 38 and dogs. 39 At least four states prohibit various forms of
hunting on Sunday, 40 two restrict the taking of oysters, 4 1 and one bans
the operation of pawnbrokers. 42 Two states prohibit conducting
"games of chance" on Sunday, 43 while at least one state forbids the
operation of adult-oriented establishments. 44 Restrictions on the
Sunday sale of motor vehicles are much more common and maintained
by at least nine states. 45 However, by far the most prevalent specific
blue laws are those restricting the sale of alcohol. These statutes come
37. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-110-402 (2006) (prohibiting all Sunday horseracing unless
approved by voters in the affected jurisdiction through referendum); 230 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/19
(2006) (prohibiting all Sunday horseracing unless approved by voters in the affected jurisdiction
through referendum); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 4:157 (2006) (prohibiting all Sunday racing unless
approved by resolution or ordinance of the governing body of the affected jurisdiction); MD. CODE
ANN., BUS. REG. § 11-504 (LexisNexis 2007) (prohibiting mile thoroughbred racing on Sunday
before noon); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 3205 (2006) (allowing Sunday sports when approved
by referendum of a city, "except boxing, horseracing, air circuses or wrestling"); N.H. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 332-D:3 (2006) (prohibiting horseracing before "midday").
38. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14-164a (2007) (banning motor vehicle racing before noon on
Sunday unless a permit is issued by the jurisdiction where the race will be held); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 55-22-109 (2006) (prohibiting Sunday racing before noon or after six p.m.).
39. See ARK. CODE ANN. § 23-111-502 (2006) (prohibiting any dog racing on Sunday); N.H.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 332-D:3 (2006) (prohibiting dog racing before "midday").
40. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 26-73 (2007) (declaring Sunday "a closed season except for the
purpose of trapping," although "[a]rtificially propagated birds ... may be shot on Sundays on
licensed private shooting preserves;" under discussion for amendment as of April 2007); MD.
CODE ANN., NAT. RES. § 10-410 (LexisNexis 2007) (banning the hunting of game birds or
mammals on Sunday unless the hunter uses state certified raptors, is part of an unarmed fox
chase, or is hunting specific pen-reared game birds; under discussion for amendment as of April
2007); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 23:4-24 (West 2007) (banning hunting on Sunday unless hunting
raccoon between midnight and sunrise or trapping fur-bearing animals; under discussion for
amendment as of April 2007); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 103-2 (2006) (banning all hunting on Sunday
unless in defense of one's property).
41. See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 50:2-11 (West 2007) (prohibiting any person from catching clams
or oysters on Sunday unless they do so on Rarian Bay, Sandy Hook Bay, Shrewsbury River, or
Navesink River); VA. CODE ANN. § 28.2-530 (2007) (prohibiting persons from taking oysters on
Sunday unless not more than a bushel is taken for personal use by hand or the oysters are
"cultured").
42. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 446.217 (2007).
43. See MD. CODE. ANN., CRIM. LAW § 13-606(e)(2) (LexisNexis 2007) (prohibiting bingo on
Sundays in Baltimore county); N.J. STAT. ANN § 5:8-58 (West 2007) (banning "games of chance"
unless allowed by a municipality's ordinance).
44. TENN. CODE ANN. § 7-51-1402 (2006).
45. See 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/5-106 (2006); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:193 (2006); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 3203 (2006); MD. CODE ANN., Bus. REG. § 18-101(d) (LexisNexis 2006)
(banning Sunday sale of motor vehicles except in Howard, Montgomery, and Prince George
counties); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 435.251 (2007); MINN. STAT. § 168.275 (2007) (under discussion
for amendment as of April 2007); MO. ANN. STAT. § 578.120 (West 2006); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §
918 (2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-5-19 (2006)(under discussion for amendment as of April 2007).
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46
in a variety of forms, including bans on the sale of "hard" liquor only;
bans on alcohol sales based on location, i.e. package stores versus
restaurants; 4 7 bans on the delivery of alcohol; 48 and various limits on
the hours during which certain types of alcohol can be sold, often
49
dependent on the place of sale.
In both general and specific Sunday closing laws, states often
provide their political subdivisions the ability to "opt out" of the statelevel restrictions. For example, in Missouri, New Hampshire, and
South Carolina, a municipality or county can permit an activity
otherwise prohibited by the state's general blue law by conducting a
50
referendum or passing an ordinance authorizing the activity.
Kentucky provides a similar provision but still prohibits the opening
of certain businesses before noon on Sunday. 5 1 Several states also
specifically provide cities and counties the opportunity to modify or opt
out of alcohol restrictions. 52 Conversely, several states allow
municipalities or counties to increase the number of activities
restricted on Sunday. In addition to their opt-out option, cities in
Kentucky and New Hampshire can also broaden their states' general
blue law by regulating otherwise unaffected activities. 53 Similarly,

46. E.g., TEX. ALCO. BEV. CODE ANN. § 105.01 (Vernon 2006) (under discussion for
amendment as of April 2007).
47. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 30-91(d) (2007) (prohibiting Sunday sale of "alcoholic
liquor in places operating under package store permits, drug store permits, manufacturer
permits for beer or grocery store beer permits").
48. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 25633 (West 2007) (providing that no
"manufacturer, winegrower, distilled spirits manufacturer's agent, rectifier, or wholesaler of any
alcoholic beverage shall deliver. . . any alcoholic beverage to or for any person holding an on-sale
or off-sale license on Sunday").
49. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 340A.504 (West 2007) (prohibiting sale of 3.2% malt liquor
between two a.m. and ten a.m. on Sunday and "intoxicating liquor for consumption on the
licensed premises" after two a.m. on Sunday unless dispensed from a hotel mini-bar or with food
at a restaurant, club, bowling alley, or hotel that can seat at least thirty).
50. See MO. ANN. STAT. § 578.100 (West 2006) (allowing any county to exempt itself from
the state Sunday restriction by adopting an ordinance after public hearing, and permitting
counties or cities with a population over four hundred thousand to do the same by referendum);
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 332-D:4 (2006) (stating that nothing prevents "the governing body of any
city or town from adopting bylaws and ordinances permitting and regulating retail business,
plays, games, sports, and exhibitions on Sundays"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 53-1-160 (2006) (providing
that "the county governing body may by ordinance suspend the application of the Sunday work
prohibitions").
51. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 436.165 (West 2006). New Jersey maintains a ban on specific
activities, including the sale of clothing, building materials, furniture, and home or business
furnishings; however, a municipality must vote to opt into the statute by referendum. N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 40A:64-1 to -2 (West 2005) (under discussion for amendment as of April 2007).
52. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 3-3-210 (2006) (prohibiting the sale of "intoxicating alcoholic
liquor" on Sunday unless approved by referendum of a city or county, in which case it can be sold
after noon); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 23-307 to 308 (2007) (prohibiting Sunday sale or delivery of "any
alcoholic liquor" unless approved by resolution of a county's board of commissioners).
53. KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 436.165 (West 2006); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 332-D:4 (2006).
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although Mississippi does not maintain a state-level general blue law,
54
it does allow its municipalities and counties to adopt their own.
As these examples demonstrate, no two states maintain the
same blue law scheme. Influenced by their own unique history and
character, states often have widely different opinions as to which
activities warrant Sunday restriction and what level of restriction that
should be. 55 Not surprisingly, these same differences often result in
varying levels of enforcement dependent upon the jurisdiction
involved. 56 In some states, there is "a significant difference between
what the law says and what it does." 57 Outside of alcohol restrictions,
law enforcement officials may find little merit in prowling store aisles
in search of prohibited items offered for sale. Instead, blue law
enforcement may only result when savvy businesses complain to
authorities that their competitors are selling a prohibited and no
doubt in-demand item on Sunday. 58 Such was the case in
Massachusetts, where a competitor of Whole Foods Market
complained to the state's Attorney General that the grocery store
planned to open on Thanksgiving 2005 in violation of the state's blue
law banning the operation of certain businesses on state-approved
holidays. 59 Based on this complaint, the Attorney General warned not
only Whole Foods but also Wal-Mart, Big Lots, and Family Dollar that
state law required them to close on Thanksgiving. 60 When a Super 88
grocery store opened nonetheless, local law enforcement ordered it to
close; however, five other Massachusetts Super 88s were allowed to

54. See MISS. CODE. ANN. § 21-19-39 (2006) ("[T]he governing authorities of counties and
municipalities may adopt... ordinances regulating, restricting and prohibiting the sale of goods
and services at retail on the day of the week commonly called 'Sunday.' Such ordinances... may
also regulate and restrict the hours during which such goods and services may be sold .... ").
Interestingly, a city in Louisiana with a population greater than twenty-five thousand can
regulate or prohibit the Sunday operation of bakeries, meat markets, and butcher shops, while
any municipality in New Jersey can regulate the Sunday operation of beauty parlors. See LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:4783 (2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 40:48-2.1 (West 2006).

55. This different treatment often manifests itself by region. For example, Sunday
restrictions are much more common in the East and South than the West and Midwest. LABAND
& HEINBUCH, supra note 1, at 48.
56. Id. at 136.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Megan Tench & Chase Davis, Bustling Stores Ask: What Blue Laws? Super 88 Says
Warning Missed, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 25, 2005, at Al. Although it may seem strange to view a
law prohibiting an activity on Thanksgiving as "blue," Thanksgiving is actually a religious
holiday. Steven B. Epstein, Rethinking the Constitutionalityof Ceremonial Deism, 96 COLUM. L.
REV. 2083, 2149 (1996) (explaining that "[t]he Thanksgiving holiday was unquestionably a
religious holiday both at Plymouth Rock and when George Washington proclaimed the first
American Thanksgiving," and that "the religious aspect... endures").
60. Tench & Davis, supra note 59.
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remain open. 6 1 The chain of Asian food stores claimed to be unaware
of the state's blue law, explaining that it had always remained open on
holidays not typically celebrated by the Asian community. 62 During
Christmas of the same year, authorities again specifically monitored
grocery and department stores to ensure no blue law violations
occurred.

63

The Massachusetts experience is illustrative of blue law
enforcement nationwide: although often neglected, Sunday restrictions
remain on the books of most states and can be enforced at the whim of
local law enforcement, state officials, or even competitors. It is true
that some view this inconsistent application as proof that modern blue
laws are little more than irrelevant relics from America's Puritan
past. 64 However, it is just this public indifference, combined with the
potential for arbitrary enforcement, that makes blue laws especially
dangerous.
III. BLUE LAWS AND THE SUPREME COURT

A. Blue Law Jurisprudence
Although blue laws have existed since the country's
colonization, not all Americans have readily accepted their validity.
The Supreme Court heard its first blue law challenge in the 1885 case
of Soon Hing v. Crowley. 65 In Crowley, the Court upheld a San
Francisco ordinance prohibiting the washing or ironing of clothes in
public laundries on Sunday as a valid exercise of the state's police
power.6 6 The Court reasoned that "[l]aws setting aside Sunday as a
day of rest are upheld, not from any right of the government to
legislate for the promotion of religious observances, but from its right
to protect all persons from the physical and moral debasement which
comes from uninterrupted labor." 67 Despite this early holding,
litigation challenging blue laws continued, culminating in 1961 when
the Supreme Court heard four cases dealing with the blue laws of

61.
62.
63.

Id.
Id.
Mac Daniel, Back and Blue: Largely Ignored, Puritan Laws Like 'Common Day of Rest'

Revisited for the Holidays, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 4, 2005, at B1.

64. See, e.g., King, supra note 23, at 676 (claiming current blue laws are "a pale reminder of
a time when legislation banned Sunday work, travel, and recreation").
65. Soon Hing v. Crowley, 113 U.S. 703 (1885).
66. Id. at 705, 710.
67. Id. at 710.
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Maryland, Pennsylvania, and Massachusetts. 68 In each case, the Court
overwhelmingly upheld the Sunday restrictions as valid.
Arguably the most significant case decided by the Court was
McGowan v. Maryland.69 Plaintiffs, seven employees at a large
discount store, were convicted and fined for selling a three-ring binder,
floor wax, stapler, staples, and a toy submarine in violation of
Maryland's general blue law banning the Sunday sale of all
merchandise except tobacco, confectionaries, milk, bread, fruits,
gasoline, oils, greases, medicines, and periodicals. 70 Further exempted
for sale in the plaintiffs' county were all foodstuffs, automobile and
boating accessories, flowers, toiletries, hospital supplies, and
souvenirs. 71 The plaintiffs appealed their convictions, claiming
Maryland's entire blue law scheme violated the Equal Protection, Due
Process, Free Exercise, and Establishment Clauses of the Federal
72
Constitution.
The Court began by rejecting the plaintiffs' equal protection
challenges. The plaintiffs first claimed that the statutory
classifications dictating what could and could not be sold were
irrational and unrelated to the legislation's alleged purpose. Applying
a rational basis standard of review, the Court disagreed, holding that
the list of prohibited goods was not arbitrary but instead represented
the legislature's reasonable finding that the sale of certain items was
necessary "either for the health of the populace or for the
enhancement of the recreational atmosphere of the day." 73 For
instance, "a family which takes a Sunday ride into the country will
need gasoline for the automobile and may find pleasant a soft drink or
fresh fruit."74 Moreover, "newspapers and drug products should always
be available to the public." 75 The Court also dismissed the plaintiffs'
claims that the statutes created unreasonable inequality either
between the retailers of different counties or between different types
76
of retailers.
In a brief discussion, the Court rejected the plaintiffs' claims
that Maryland's blue laws were unconstitutionally vague in violation

68. Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, Inc., 366 U.S. 617 (1961); Braunfeld v.
Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc., v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582
(1961); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
69. McGowan, 366 U.S. at 420.
70. Id. at 422-23.
71. Id. at 423.
72. Id. at 422.
73. Id. at 425-26.
74. Id. at 426.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 427-28.
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of the Due Process Clause, finding that "business people of ordinary
intelligence.., would be able to know what exceptions are
encompassed by the statute either as a matter of ordinary commercial
77
knowledge or by simply making a reasonable investigation."
Similarly, the Court dismissed the free exercise challenge on the basis
that the plaintiffs lacked standing because they did not claim that the
78
blue laws infringed upon their own religious beliefs.
The heart of the plaintiffs' case lay in their Establishment
Clause claim. The Court summarized the plaintiffs' argument as
follows:
Sunday is the Sabbath day of the predominant Christian sects; that the purpose of the
enforced stoppage of labor on that day is to facilitate and encourage church attendance;
that the purpose of setting Sunday as a day of universal rest is to induce people with no
religion or people with marginal religious beliefs to join the predominant Christian
sects; [and] that the purpose of the atmosphere of tranquility created by Sunday closing
79
is to aid the conduct of church services and religious observance of the sacred day.

The Court acknowledged that "the original laws which dealt
with Sunday labor were motivated by religious forces."8 0 However, it
claimed that Sunday restrictions had since "evolved 8 1 to become
legitimate means of protecting the public welfare "wholly apart from
their original purposes or connotations. 8 2 Most modern blue laws, it
felt, had "[tihe present purpose and effect... to provide a uniform day
of rest for all citizens," a secular and therefore valid motivation under
the Establishment Clause.8 3 As evidence, the Court examined the
various activities exempted from Maryland's blue laws, determining
the exceptions were "fashioned for the purpose of providing a Sunday
atmosphere of recreation, cheerfulness, repose, and enjoyment."8 4
Consequently, "the air of the day" was "one of relaxation rather
than ... religion. '8 5 The Court saw labor and trade associations' newfound support of Sunday restrictions as added proof of their
recreational purpose.8 6 Based on this evidence, the Court held
Maryland's Sunday restrictions did not violate the Establishment
Clause.8 7 In a telling passage, the Court summarized its reasoning:

77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at

428.
429.
431.
435.
445.
448.
435.
452.
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"Sunday is a day apart from all others. The cause is irrelevant; the
88
fact exists."
The Supreme Court relied heavily on McGowan in its other
1961 blue law decisions. In Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown,Inc. v.
McGinley, a large discount department store challenged a
Pennsylvania blue law prohibiting all "worldly employment," business,
and sports on Sunday, not including works of necessity and charity,
wholesome recreation,8 9 milk and necessaries delivery during certain
time periods, and public utility work. 90 Citing the standards it
articulated in McGowan, the Court rejected the plaintiffs equal
protection challenge, finding it within the legislature's power to
determine that certain commodities and types of sale were
particularly disruptive to the "intended atmosphere of the day." 91
Similarly, the Court turned to McGowan in determining that the
Pennsylvania statute did not violate the Establishment Clause. 92 It
acknowledged that "the connection between religion and the original
Pennsylvania Sunday closing statutes was obvious and indisputable"
and that "the present statutory sections still contain[ed] some traces
of the early religious influence." 93 However, it held "neither the
statute's purpose nor its effect [was] religious," relying primarily on
the legislative history of recent amendments for support. 94 As it did in
McGowan, the Court also found the plaintiff lacked standing to bring
95
a free exercise claim.
Such was not the case in Braunfeld v. Brown, which also
involved a challenge to Pennsylvania's general blue law. 96 Unlike the
plaintiffs in McGowan and Two Guys, those in Braunfeld did complain
that the state's blue laws infringed upon their personal religious
beliefs; therefore, they had standing to bring a free exercise claim. 97
Plaintiffs were Orthodox Jewish merchants whose religious beliefs
88. Id.
89. Wholesome recreation was defined as "golf, tennis, boating, swimming, bowling,
basketball, picnicking, shooting at inanimate targets or similar healthful or recreational
exercises and activities." Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc., v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582,
585 (1961).
90. Id.
91. Id. at 589-92.
92. Id. at 592-98.
93. Id. at 592, 594. Those traces included several provisions referring to Sunday as "the
Lord's day" or "Sabbath Day." However, the Court found these lacked significance since the
"traces that have remained are simply the result of legislative oversight in failing to remove
them." Id. at 594.
94. Id. at 598.
95. Id. at 592 (stating that appellant lacks standing to allege "that the statute
discriminates against certain religions").
96. Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 600-01 (1961).
97. Id. at 601-02.
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required them to close their stores on Saturday. 98 However,
Pennsylvania law also forbade them from opening on Sunday. 99 As a
result of remaining closed on both days, the plaintiffs claimed to suffer
substantial economic loss that prevented them from freely exercising
their religion. 10 0 In rejecting their claim, the Court again relied on
McGowan, noting the evolution of Sunday laws from "wholly religious
sanctions to legislation concerned with the establishment of a day of
community tranquility, respite and recreation."' 10 ' It noted that the
Pennsylvania statute did not make the plaintiffs' religious practices
illegal but "simply regulate[d] a secular activity" that made "the
practice of their religious beliefs more expensive."'1 2 This indirect
burden on the plaintiffs' religion did not invalidate the statute since
legislating to provide a common day of rest, the statute's purpose, was
within the state's police power.'0 3 Moreover, the Court would not
require Pennsylvania to exempt those who observed a non-Sunday
Sabbath from its blue laws.'0 4 Although this might be "the wiser
solution," the Supreme Court found legitimate reasons why a state

might choose not to adopt

it.105

The last case of the blue law quartet also involved Orthodox
Jewish plaintiffs, this time challenging Massachusetts Sunday closing
laws. 10 6 In Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market, the Supreme
98. Id. at 601.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 601-02.
101. Id. at 602.
102. Id. at 605.
103. Id. at 607.
104. Id. at 608.
105. Id. at 608-09. Today, many states have taken the Supreme Court's advice and enacted
statutes that exempt those who celebrate a Saturday Sabbath from blue law prosecution;
however, these statutes do not apply to those who do not observe a Sabbath. See CONN. GEN
STAT. § 53-303 (2007) (exempting liability for a person who "conscientiously believes" in a
Saturday Sabbath and "actually refrains from work, labor or business" on that day); 820 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 140/4 (2006) (requiring employers to designate a day of rest for each employee that
is to work on Sunday); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 436.160 (West 2006) (exempting from liability
persons who observe as a Sabbath one day out of each seven days); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, §
3209 (2006) (exempting persons "conscientiously believing' in a Saturday Sabbath and
"refraining from secular business and labor on that day" so long as they "doo not disturb other
persons"); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 136, § 6 (2007) (exempting, among other things, persons who
observe a Saturday Sabbath and close all of their business located within the Commonwealth
during that twenty-four hour period; under discussion for amendment as of April 2007); N.Y.
GEN. Bus. LAW § 6 (McKinney 2007) (exempting persons who "uniformly keepo another day of
the week as holy time;" under discussion for amendment as of April 2007); N.D. CENT. CODE §
12.1-30-01 (2005) (exempting persons who close their place of business from midnight until noon
on the day observed as the Sabbath); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 909 (2007) (allowing as a defense that
"the accused uniformly keeps another day of the week as holy time"); S.C. CODE ANN. § 53-1-40
(2006) (providing for a Saturday Sabbath defense only within Charleston County).
106. Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market of Mass., Inc., 366 U.S. 617 (1961).

20071

MODERN SUNDAY CLOSING LAWS

1287

Court again rejected the plaintiffs' equal protection challenge under a
rational basis standard of review, finding exceptions to the state's blue
laws were not arbitrary but "useful in adding to Sunday's enjoyment"
and increasing "the day's special character." 10 7 Similarly, although
"the Massachusetts statutes have an unmistakably religious origin,"
the Court held they were not an establishment of religion because
10 8
their present purpose was "to provide an atmosphere of recreation."
Finally, the Court summarily rejected the plaintiffs' free exercise
claim, relying on its decision in Braunfeld.0 9
Justice Douglas dissented vigorously in all four cases,
addressing each in a single opinion.1 10 He disagreed with the
majority's contention that blue laws had somehow "evolved" ' ' from
their original religious purpose, stating, "[n]o matter how much is
written, no matter what is said, the parentage of these laws is the
Fourth Commandment; and they serve and satisfy the religious
predispositions of our Christian communities." 1 2 In his view, the
Court could not simply dismiss as "irrelevant" the state's reasoning for
choosing Sunday as the day of rest; rather, "the cause of Sunday's
being a day apart is determinative."'1 1 3 To illustrate the continuing
connection between blue laws and Christianity, Justice Douglas
hypothesized the public reaction if Jews or Seventh-Day Adventists
14
controlled the legislature and made it criminal to work on Saturday.
Would Baptists, Catholics, Methodists, and Presbyterians willingly
accept this as a day of rest? Or would they bring the same complaints
as the plaintiffs in McGowan and Braunfeld? To Justice Douglas, the
purpose of Sunday closing laws was clear: to "force minorities to obey
the majority's religious feeling of what is due and proper for a
Christian community."" 5 Because these laws "compel minorities to
observe a second Sabbath, not their own" they 'prefer one religion
16
over another"' in violation of the First Amendment."

107. Id. at 622-23.
108. Id. at 624, 627.
109. Id. at 630-31.
110. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 561 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Justice
Frankfurter wrote a separate concurrence also applying to all four cases. Id. at 459 (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
111. Id. at 435 (majority opinion).
112. Id. at 572-73 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
113. Id. at 573 n.6.
114. Id. at 565.
115. Id. at 576.
116. Id. at 577 (quoting Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947)).
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B. Current Establishment Clause Analysis
The Supreme Court has decided no significant cases addressing
the constitutionality of blue laws after McGowan and its companions
in 1961.117 However, since that time the Court's treatment of
Establishment Clause claims has changed significantly. Even today
exactly what test the Court will apply when determining
establishment issues remains an unsettled question. Therefore, in
order to understand the constitutional status of modern blue laws, it is
necessary to examine the various approaches utilized by the Supreme
Court when deciding Establishment Clause claims: the Lemon,
endorsement, and coercion tests.
1. The Lemon Test
Ten years after it decided McGowan v. Maryland, the Supreme
Court set forth its most influential and controversial Establishment
Clause test. 118 In Lemon v. Kurtzman, the Court determined that a
statute could only survive an Establishment Clause challenge if it (1)
had "a secular legislative purpose," (2) produced a "principal or
primary effect" that did not advance or inhibit religion, and (3) did
"not foster 'an excessive government entanglement with religion.' "119
The Court arrived at this three-pronged "Lemon test" by combining
various criteria it had articulated in previous cases.1 20 Notably, the
secular purpose prong seems a "direct descendent" of the Court's
12 1
opinion in McGowan.
Although many courts have frequently relied upon the Lemon
test when deciding Establishment Clause challenges, it has also been
the subject of severe criticism from both commentators and Supreme
Court Justices. 122 One of the most common complaints is that of
workability. 12 3 Specifically, many claim that determining legislative
117. See discussion supra Part III.A.
118. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 606 (1971) (holding that state statutes providing
financial aid to religious schools were unconstitutional).
119. Id. at 612-13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
120. Id.
121. See Marc A. Stadtmauer, Remember the Sabbath? The New York Blue Laws and the
Future of the Establishment Clause, 12 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 213, 227-28 (1994) (examining
the constitutionality of New York's blue laws).
122. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1501 (5th ed. 2005) (noting that
although the Lemon test "has not been formally repudiated by the Supreme Court [,] a majority
of the justices sitting in 2005 have criticized it); Stadtmauer, supra note 121, at 226-27 (stating
that the "Lemon test became the standard by which many cases were evaluated" but noting the
"fairly scathing criticism" it has received from commentators and Supreme Court justices).
123. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 112 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (arguing that
the Lemon test should be abandoned because it "has no basis in the history of the amendment it
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"purpose" is an impossible task, 124 while ascertaining the "primary or
principal effect" of a statute is almost as difficult. 125 Additionally,
some object to Lemon's entanglement prong, suggesting it contradicts
the other two requirements since "some administrative entanglement
is essential to ensure that government aid does not excessively
promote religious purposes." 126 Such widespread criticism and discord
within the Court itself have resulted in a decreased reliance on Lemon
127
in recent years.
However, the Supreme Court has refused to abandon the
Lemon framework entirely, as demonstrated in the 2005 Ten
Commandments cases, McCreary County v. ACLU128 and Van Orden v.
Perry. 29 In McCreary, plaintiffs challenged displays of the Ten
Commandments in two Kentucky county courthouses as violating the
Establishment Clause.' 30 A majority of the Court agreed, relying
heavily on Lemon's purpose prong in reaching its decision. 13' The
Court explained that considerations of "secular legislative purpose"
had been a "common" element of the Court's Establishment Clause
analysis ever since Lemon was decided. 3 2 Moreover, it stated that,
although it had been "seldom dispositive," the purpose inquiry
"nevertheless serves an important function" of determining whether
the government has acted neutrally towards religion as required by
133
the Establishment Clause.
Applying its analysis, the Court found the Kentucky counties
had displayed the Ten Commandments for expressly religious
purposes in violation of the Establishment Clause, a fact indicated by
legislative history, the nature of the original display, and

seeks to interpret, is difficult to apply and yields unprincipled results"); Lisa M. Kahle,
Comment, Making "Lemon-Aid" from the Supreme Court's Lemon: Why Current Establishment
Clause Jurisprudence Should be Replaced by a Modified Coercion Test, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV.

349, 363 (claiming "all three prongs of the Lemon test contain inherent flaws that prevent the
test from being practically workable in a satisfactory manner").
124. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that
"discerning the subjective motivation of those enacting the statute is, to be honest, almost always
an impossible task").
125. Kahle, supra note 123, at 359-60.
126. KATHLEEN M. SULLIVAN & GERALD GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1547 (15th ed.

2004) (internal quotations omitted).
127. Id.
128. McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (holding that two Kentucky displays of
the Ten Commandments violated the Establishment Clause).
129. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (holding that a Texas display of the Ten
Commandments did not violate the Establishment Clause).
130. McCreary, 545 U.S. at 852.
131. Id. at 859-65.
132. Id. at 859-60.
133. Id.
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modifications made to it after litigation had begun. 3 4 Although the
plaintiffs claimed "true 'purpose' is unknowable," the Court disagreed,
stating that "[e]xamination of purpose is a staple of statutory
interpretation that makes up the daily fare of every appellate court in
the county." 135 Far from being unworkable, Lemon's purpose prong is
when such
a "straightforward" test that only finds a religious purpose
136
here.
case
the
was
as
conclusion,"
"commonsense
the
is
In Van Orden v. Perry,137 the Supreme Court relied less on
Lemon than it did in McCreary, although the Lemon test did not go
entirely without mention. Van Orden involved a challenge to a Ten
Commandments monument located on the grounds of the Texas State
Capitol. 138 The monument was part of a larger exhibit involving
twenty-one historical markers and seventeen other monuments
located throughout the grounds.139 Unlike in McCreary, the Court held
this display did not violate the Establishment Clause.1 40 However, no
majority agreed on the reasoning for its decision. Writing for the
plurality, Chief Justice Rehnquist did not apply the Lemon test,
finding "it not useful in dealing with the sort of passive monument
that Texas has erected."1 4 1 However, he left open the possibility of
applying the test in the future.1 4 2 Justice Breyer, the unlikely swing
vote in the two cases, wrote in his concurrence that "no single
mechanical formula.., can accurately draw the constitutional line in
every case."' 4 3 Instead, he advocated the use of the Court's prior tests
as "guideposts."1 44 Although he felt Texas's display might pass the
Lemon test, he explained that his decision relied "less upon a literal
application of any particular test than upon consideration of the basic
'1 45
purposes of the First Amendment's Religion Clauses themselves."
McCreary and Van Orden clearly demonstrate Lemon's
uncertain future. Add to this the recent addition of two new Supreme
Court Justices, and the uncertainty only increases. The Lemon test,
however, has weathered frequent and vigorous attack, surviving for

134. Id. at 868-74.
135. Id. at 861.
136. Id. at 862-63.
137. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005).
138. Id. at 681.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 686.
142. See id. (stating that "[w]hatever may be the fate of the Lemon test in the larger scheme
of Establishment Clause jurisprudence," it was inapplicable to the facts of this case).
143. Id. at 699 (Breyer, J., concurring).
144. Id. at 700.
145. Id. at 703-04.
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over thirty-years. It is highly unlikely that its influence will cease
now.
2. The Endorsement Test
Justice O'Connor proposed an alternative Establishment
Clause test in her concurrence to Lynch v. Donnelly. In that 1984 case,
plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of a nativity scene exhibited
by a Rhode Island city as part of a larger Christmas-themed display.146
The majority found the display constitutional through an application
of the Lemon test, although it emphasized its "unwillingness to be
confined to any single test or criterion in this sensitive area" of
Establishment Clause claims.1 47 With regard to Lemon's first prong,
the Court found the city had erected the nativity scene in order to
celebrate a holiday and depict its origins, a "legitimate secular
purpose."1 48 Similarly, the principal or primary effect of the display
did not advance religion, at least no more so than other "benefits and
endorsements previously held not violative of the Establishment
Clause." 149 The city also passed Lemon's final entanglement prong,
since it had no contact with church authorities concerning the display
and spent no public funds regarding it, apart from the initial
50
purchase.
Justice O'Connor agreed with the majority's result but not its
mode of analysis. 151 Rather than apply the traditional Lemon test, she
focused
on
"institutional
entanglement"
and
government
"endorsement or disapproval of religion."' 52 To Justice O'Connor, the
majority's focus had been misplaced: in this case, entanglement was
not a "central" issue; rather, endorsement was. 5 3 Justice O'Connor
explained that determining whether endorsement has occurred
146. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 671 (1984). Throughout its opinion, the Supreme Court
refers to the nativity scene by its formal name, creche. Beyond the nativity scene itself, the
display also included a Santa Claus house, sleigh, Christmas tree, carolers, elephant, teddy bear,
and a "Seasons Greetings" banner. Id.
147. Id. at 679, 687.
148. Id. at 681.
149. Id. at 682. The other benefits and endorsements mentioned include spending public
money on textbooks and transportation for students in church-sponsored schools, providing
grants to church-sponsored colleges and universities, exempting church properties from certain
taxes, allowing legislative prayers, allowing a release time program from religious training, and,
notably, maintaining Sunday Closing Laws. Id. at 681-82.
150. Id. at 684.
151. See id. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (stating that she "write[s] separately to suggest
a clarification of [the Court's] Establishment Clause doctrine").
152. Id. at 689.
153. See id. at 689-90 (finding no entanglement with religion and describing as the "central
issue in this case" whether the city endorsed Christianity by displaying a nativity scene).
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requires the Court to examine both the government's intended
purpose for acting and the message actually conveyed by those
actions. 154 Although this analysis derives from combining Lemon's
purpose and effect prongs, Justice O'Connor felt it more
representative of the Establishment Clause's meaning than the
traditional test. 155 To her, "[t]he Establishment Clause prohibits
government from making adherence to religion relevant in any way to
a person's standing in the political community." 156 However,
government endorsement of religion does just that, "send[ing] a
message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full members of
1 57
the political community."
When Justice O'Connor applied her endorsement test to the
158
dispute at hand, the city's actions still passed constitutional muster.
She found that the city had not intended to endorse Christianity by
displaying the nativity scene but only to celebrate "a public holiday
159
through its traditional symbols," a legitimate secular purpose.
Moreover, the display did not have the effect of communicating a
message of government endorsement of religion, since most members
of society understand the "very strong secular components and
traditions" associated with the Christmas holiday. 160 Therefore, no
endorsement had occurred.161
Five years after Lynch, a majority of the Court adopted Justice
O'Connor's endorsement test as a legitimate analytical framework
through which to examine Establishment Clause claims. 62 In County
of Allegheny v. ACLU, plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of a
nativity scene exhibited in a county courthouse and a Chanukah
menorah placed outside a building owned jointly by the city and
county.16 3 Unlike in Lynch, the nativity scene was not part of a larger
display,'6 4 although the menorah was accompanied by a Christmas
tree and "Salute to Liberty" sign. 65 The Court began its opinion by
154. Id. at 690.
155. See id. at 688-90 (explaining that "[i]t has never been entirely clear.., how the three
parts of the [Lemon] test relate to the principles enshrined in the Establishment Clause").
156. Id. at 687.
157. Id. at 688.
158. Id. at 694.
159. Id. at 691.
160. Id. at 692.
161. Id. at 694.
162. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 593-94 (1989). That majority included
Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and O'Connor.
163. Id. at 578.
164. See id. at 580-81 (explaining that beyond the nativity scene, the display only included a
fence, poinsettias, and two small evergreen trees).
165. Id. at 581-82.
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explaining that since Lemon, it had "refined the definition of
governmental action that unconstitutionally advances religion,"
paying "particularly close attention" in recent cases "to whether the
challenged governmental practice either has the purpose or effect of
'endorsing' religion." 166 Moreover, the Court stated that the word
"endorsement" derives its meaning from other terms frequently
employed when examining the Establishment Clause, including
'1 67
"favored," "preferred," and "promotion."
In a series of opinions, the Court found the nativity scene
unconstitutional but not the menorah. 168 Four Justices joined Justice
Blackmun in applying the endorsement test to the nativity display,
finding that it had "the effect of endorsing a patently Christian
message." 169 Conversely, six Justices found the menorah display valid.
In separate opinions, Justices Blackmun and O'Connor agreed that,
unlike the nativity scene, the menorah did not amount to a
government endorsement of religion. 170 The critical difference was
context: while the nativity scene stood alone, the menorah was part of
71
larger holiday display that included references to Christmas.'
Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens also applied the
endorsement test but found the menorah display did not meet its
requirements. 172 Finally, Justices Kennedy, Rehnquist, White, and
Scalia agreed that the menorah display was constitutional but refused
to apply the endorsement test, claiming it "reflects an unjustified
173
hostility toward religion."
Like Lemon, the future of the endorsement test is unclear,
especially considering its central proponent's recent departure from
the Court. However, it has garnered support from a majority of the

166. Id. at 592.
167. Id. at 593.
168. Id. at 579.
169. Id. at 601.
170. See id. at 620 (explaining that "the city's overall display must be understood as
conveying the city's secular recognition of different traditions for celebrating the winter-holiday
season"); id. at 637 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (finding that the city's display "had neither the
purpose nor the effect of endorsing religion").
171. See id. at 616 (majority opinion) (finding by Blackmun that the menorah's purpose was
to "recogniz[e] that both Christmas and Chanukah are part of the same winter-holiday season,
which has attained a secular status in our society"); id. at. 635-36 (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(explaining that "a reasonable observer would.., appreciate that the combined display is an
effort to acknowledge the cultural diversity of our country and to convey tolerance of different
choices in matters of religious belief or nonbelief').
172. See id. at 637-38 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (labeling as
unsound the premises Justice Blackmun relied on to reach his conclusion that no endorsement
had occurred).
173. Id. at 655 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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Court on several occasions since Allegheny, 17 4 suggesting that
questions of endorsement will continue to shape Establishment Clause
jurisprudence for the foreseeable future.
3. The Coercion Test
The coercion test asks whether the government has "coerce[d]
175 Its most
anyone to support or participate in religion or its exercise."
frequent use has been in school prayer cases, since the Court has
viewed the school environment as uniquely capable of exerting "subtle
coercive pressures" on students. 176 For example, in Lee v. Weisman,
the Court struck down as violating the Establishment Clause a public
school policy allowing principals to select clergy to deliver prayers at
graduation ceremonies. 17 7 It found that the school's "supervision and
control" of the ceremony "places public pressure, as well as peer
pressure, on attending students to stand up as a group or, at least,
'78
maintain respectful silence during the invocation and benediction."'
Although it is "subtle and indirect," this pressure "can be as real as
any overt compulsion.' 7 9
In recent cases, some Justices have applied the coercion test in
situations beyond school prayer, as Justice Thomas did in his Van
Orden v. Perry concurrence. 8 0 When addressing the constitutionality
of Texas's Ten Commandment display, he argued that the Court
should "abandon the inconsistent guideposts it has adopted in
addressing Establishment Clause challenges and return to the
original meaning of the Clause," that establishment must involve
coercion.' 8 ' Since the Ten Commandments display did not compel the

174. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 291 (2000) (holding that a policy
allowing student-led prayer at public school football games was unconstitutional in part because
it "involve [d] both perceived and actual endorsement of religion").
175. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) (holding that allowing prayer at a public
school graduation was unconstitutional).
176. Id. at 588; see also Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962) (invalidating a school's
practice of daily prayer because "[w]hen the power, prestige and financial support of government
is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon religious
minorities to conform to the prevailing officially approved religion is plain").
177. Lee, 505 U.S. at 586, 599.
178. Id. at 593.
179. Id.
180. Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 692-98 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring); see discussion
supraPart III.B.1.
181. Id. at 693. Thomas explains that the constitutional framers understood establishment
to involve legal coercion, like mandatory religious observance or payment of taxes supporting
ministers. Id.
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plaintiff to do anything, it was not a violation of the Establishment
Clause. 182
Although not as widely applied as other Establishment Clause
tests, the coercion analysis has become a favorite of several Justices,
including Justices Kennedy,1 8 3 Thomas, 8 4 and Scalia.' 8 5 As a result,
its future seems slightly more certain than the endorsement test. How
widely it will be applied, however, remains to be seen.
C. Purpose and Effect: Unifying Establishment Clause Tests
As evident from the discussion above, the Supreme Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence is far from clear.186 However, it is
possible to extract common elements from the Lemon, endorsement,
and coercion tests in order to better understand the Establishment
Clause's requirements. Specifically, when applying any of the three
tests currently employed by the Court, it is necessary to examine
either (1) the government's purpose in acting or (2) the effect of its
actions.
In the Lemon and endorsement tests, the purpose and effect
factors are readily apparent. Lemon's first prong asks whether there
exists "a secular legislative purpose" and its second whether the
"principal or primary effect" of the government action advances or
inhibits religion.187 Similarly, the endorsement test's revision of
Lemon requires determining if the government intended to endorse
religion or had the effect of communicating a message of
endorsement.1 8 8 True, the terminology regarding permissible and
impermissible purposes and effects differs: while Lemon speaks of
"secular" purposes and effects "advancing" religion, the endorsement
test refers to purposes that "endorse" religion and effects that give the
appearance of "endorsement." However, Justice O'Connor made it
clear in Lynch that the concepts behind the terms are essentially the
same when she characterized Lemon's purpose and effect prongs as
representing the endorsement considerations.' 8 9 Because of these

182. Id.
183. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992).
184. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 693-94 (Thomas, J., concurring).
185. See Lee, 505 U.S. at 642 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (agreeing with the majority's use of the
coercion test but finding it wrongly applied).
186. See discussion supra Part III.B.
187. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971); see discussion supra Part II.B.1.
188. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring); see discussion
supra Part III.B.2.
189. Id. at 690; see discussion supra Part III.B.2
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similarities, reconciling the Lemon and endorsement tests is relatively
easy.
Unfortunately, bringing the coercion test into line presents
more difficulty. Unlike the Lemon and endorsement tests, a coercion
analysis involves no consideration of legislative purpose. 190 In fact, it
is just this aspect that has attracted many of its proponents. 191
However, the coercion test necessarily requires examining effect, since
the Court must decide if the government's action had the effect of
coercing someone into supporting or participating in religion.1 92 Again,
the coercive effect at issue in this test differs from the effect of
religious advancement or endorsement looked for in the Lemon and
endorsement tests. Moreover, the coercion standard is significantly
stricter than the other two tests, applying to a much narrower
category of governmental activities. For instance, while displaying the
Ten Commandments could be viewed as a government endorsement of
religion,1 93 it may not necessarily result in coercion since it does not
compel anyone to act.1 94 Such a difference means applying the coercion
test will often produce different results than those reached through
the Lemon and endorsement tests.
Despite the inherent dissimilarities among the three tests, a
comparison of all reveals that one of two factors will be determinative
in deciding whether an Establishment Clause violation has occurred:
the government's purpose in acting or the effects of those actions.
Identifying common elements that must be examined regardless of the
test applied allows the constitutionality of a state action to be
determined with much less speculation. Those concerned that a state
action violates the Establishment Clause can focus less on which
Justices might apply which standard and instead ask whether the
state action has a secular purpose and/or the effect of endorsing
religion or coercing its practice.
190. See Michele Hyndman, Tradition Is Not Law: Advocating a Single Determinative Test
for Establishment Clause Cases, 31 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 101, 119-20 (2005) (explaining that,
"[u]nder the coercion test, a court could find a government practice constitutional when the facts
reveal that the purpose of the government practice was of a religious nature").
191. See Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 636-39 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (attacking
the purpose prong of the Lemon test).
192. See Hyndman, supra note 190, at 119-20. Although Hyndman sees the coercion test's
focus on effect as making it "drastically different" from the Lemon and endorsement tests, this
Note views it as a factor that unifies the three tests. Id. at 119.
193. See McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 883 (2005) (O'Connor, J., concurring)
(stating that "[t]he purpose behind the [Ten Commandments] display is relevant because it
conveys an unmistakable message of endorsement to the reasonable observer").
194. See Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 694 (2005) (Thomas, J., concurring) (explaining
that "the mere presence of the monument along [Van Orden's] path involves no coercion and thus
does not violate the Establishment Clause" because "[iun no sense does Texas compel [him] to do
anything").
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IV. APPLYING THE COMMON THREADS: BLUE LAWS AS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL ESTABLISHMENTS OF RELIGION

After examining the elements of each of the Supreme Court's
current Establishment Clause tests, it becomes evident that modern
blue laws are unconstitutional establishments of religion. As discussed
below, not only do they lack a secular legislative purpose, but they
also have the effect of both endorsing religion and coercing citizens to
participate in a religious exercise, namely, observing the Christian
Sabbath. Therefore, modern blue laws violate the Lemon,
endorsement, and coercion tests.
A. The Religious Purpose of Blue Laws
According to the Lemon and endorsement tests, a government
action must have a secular legislative purpose in order to be valid
under the Establishment Clause. 195 This purpose requirement derives
from McGowan v. Maryland, where the Supreme Court's decision to
uphold the state's Sunday restrictions rested primarily on legislative
purpose. 196 Although the Court found the original motivation behind
the state's laws to be overtly religious, it believed the statutes had
"evolved" to represent the legislature's new desire to create a uniform
day of rest. 19 7 If another blue law challenge were brought today, it
may seem that this same analysis should apply. After all, if Sunday
restrictions had achieved a secular purpose in 1961, could they have
somehow devolved back to their original religious motivations in 2007?
The simple answer is no: they never "evolved" in the first place. This
conclusion becomes evident after examining the changes blue laws
have undergone since McGowan, specifically, which activities states
have chosen to exempt from their prohibitions and which remain
illegal.
1. Special Interest Groups and Blue Law Exceptions
When determining in McGowan that Maryland's Sunday
restrictions had a secular purpose, the Court put great weight on the
fact that the activities exempted from the state's blue laws were
"fashioned for the purpose of providing a Sunday atmosphere of
195. See discussion supra Part III.B.1-2. Although the endorsement test requires that the
government cannot have the purpose of "endorsing" religion, the consideration is sufficiently
synonymous to Lemon's "secular purpose" prong to justify using the terms interchangeably. See
discussion supra Part III.C.
196. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); see discussion supra Part III.A.
197. McGowan, 366 U.S. at 435, 445.
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recreation, cheerfulness, repose and enjoyment." 198 These exceptions
included the Sunday sale of tobacco, milk, bread, periodicals, boating
accessories, and souvenirs. 199 In specific counties, the Sunday
operation of beaches, bathhouses, and amusement parks was allowed,
200
as was the sale of any merchandise incidental to those operations.
Moreover, certain areas of the state also permitted sports like football,
lacrosse, car racing, and pool. 20 1 As the Court observed, these
activities do seem connected to rest and recreation. 20 2 However, the
massive exceptions states now provide to their blue laws do not
exhibit this same recreational character. Rather, modern blue law
exceptions seem more the result of special interest group pressure or
other economic considerations than an attempt by the state to create a
20 3
common day of rest.
For instance, South Carolina provides several exceptions to its
general ban on Sunday "worldly work, labor [and] business" before
one-thirty p.m. that have little to do with recreation. 20 4 A prime
example is the broad exception given to the entire industries of rubber
and plastic mold-making 20 5 and textile manufacturing. 20 6 Such
exceptions are not required because the businesses are "necessities" or
continuously operated, since these contingencies are provided for in
other statutory provisions. 20 7 Instead, the state has simply decidedmost likely for economic reasons-that employees in these industries
should not be part of the otherwise common day of rest. Perhaps even
more significant is the specific exemption South Carolina provides for
counties hoping to reduce their property tax burden by expanding
their sales tax base. 20 8 When a county collects more than $900,000 in
property tax in one year, it is automatically exempt from the state's
Sunday restrictions. 20 9 This allows counties to offset high, and no
doubt unpopular, property taxes with a sales tax base increased by an
additional day on which to shop. Though such an exemption is
admirable in its recognition of the consequences caused by general
198. Id. at 448.

199. Id. at 422-23.
200. Id. at 423.
201. Id. at 424.
202. Id. at 426.
203. See LABAND & HEINBUCH, supra note 1, at 48 (explaining that exceptions to Sunday
restrictions "have been granted to special interest groups with strong enough lobbying influence
in the corridors of the state capital [sic]").
204. S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 53-1-5, 53-1-40 (2006).
205. Id.

206.
207.
208.
209.

§ 53-1-100.

Id. § 53-1-110.
Id. §§ 53-1-40, 53-1-130.
Id. § 53.1-150.
Id.
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Sunday restrictions, i.e., a decreased sales tax base, it also effectively
undermines any recreational justification for a Sunday ban in other
localities, since a significant economic need can invalidate the public
need for a day of rest.
Other states with general Sunday prohibitions also maintain
exemptions entirely unrelated to recreation. For example, Maine
provides a plethora of exceptions to its broad ban on Sunday business,
including exemptions for monument dealers, real estate brokers,
2 10
satellite facilities, and mobile home sales representatives.
Additionally, during the very profitable shopping season that occurs
between Thanksgiving and Christmas, any business can open on
Sunday between noon and five p.m., notwithstanding the normal
statutory requirement to the contrary. 2 11 Similarly, West Virginia
exempts from its general prohibition on Sunday "work, labor, or
business" 2 12 the "operation of a retail outlet for the exclusive sale of its
products by an industry located in West Virginia." 21 3 Moreover, in New
Jersey, "no person shall dredge upon, or throw, cast or drag an oyster
dredge" on Sunday unless doing so in one of four specific bodies of
water, most likely singled out because of the income they produce or
214
the pressure exerted by companies that work there.
Alcohol restrictions may provide the most glaring examples of
interest group pressure. For instance, Connecticut forbids the sale or
consumption of "alcoholic liquor" on Christmas unless that liquor is
sold with food, or, more tellingly, at a casino. 21 5 Additionally, although
any town may reduce the hours during which "alcoholic liquor" may be
sold, such towns cannot do so for sales at airports. 21 6 Similarly, several
states maintain broad prohibitions on Sunday alcohol sales but
specifically exclude wineries. 21 7 In many states, the influence of
interest groups is most evident in the types of alcohol prohibited on
Sunday. For instance, before Nashville became the home of the NFL
team the Tennessee Titans, alcohol by the drink could not be sold in

210.
211.
212.
213.
214.

ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 3204 (2006).
Id. § 3204 (1)(A)(2).
W. VA. CODE § 61-10-25 (2007).
Id. § 61-10-26.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 50:2-11 (West 2007).

215. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 30-91(a)(4) (2007).

216. Id. § 30-91(b).
217. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 12-47-901 (2006) (prohibiting the Sunday sale of "malt, vinous,
or spirituous liquors ...except that, for a limited winery or vintner's restaurant licensee, sales of
vinous liquors in sealed containers or by the glass shall be permitted on Sunday beginning at 8
a.m. until 12 midnight"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 4, § 512A(1) (2007) (exempting from the Sunday
prohibition on alcohol sales wineries or farm wineries, although sales can only occur from noon
until six p.m.).
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the state before noon. 2 18 However, football games frequently started
earlier than this. 219 Consequently, the law quickly changed to appease
thirsty football fans, allowing alcoholic drinks to be sold starting at
ten a.m.2 2° Despite this change to Tennessee's by-the-drink laws, the
retail sale of beer and other low grade alcohol on Sunday was still
limited to after noon,22 1 and the retail sale of liquor and wine on
Sundays remained completely prohibited. 222 As commentators have
noted, these decisions reflect the relative power and success of the
liquor, beer, and sports lobbies in Tennessee, not state concerns
223
regarding public health or safety.
Many of the exceptions detailed above reflect the unfortunate
realties of a modern business world. To companies concerned with the
bottom line, ceasing all work for an entire day once a week is simply
not economically feasible. 224 As a result, interest groups pressure the
legislature for blue law exemptions, and legislators, concerned with
their state's prosperity or their own chances of reelection, agree. The
wisdom of this exchange as a policy matter is not at issue; however,
the government's motive in granting exemptions is crucial in
understanding the constitutionality of Sunday restrictions. No longer
can exceptions to blue laws be used as evidence of a legislature's
purpose to create a day of rest as they were on McGowan. In fact,
modern exceptions do the exact opposite: By allowing more industries
to operate on Sunday, they ensure more employees will be working.
Therefore, states must now look to other sources to demonstrate the
secular purpose behind their blue laws.

218. Jaime Sarrio, Liquor Stores Close Doors for New Year's Eve Sunday, TENNESSEAN, Dec.
27, 2006, at 1A, availableat http://www.tennessean.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20061227/
NEWS01/ 612270417.
219. Id.
220. Id.
221. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 57-5-301 (2006) (allowing for limited sale of beer and other
alcoholic beverages containing less than five percent alcohol).
222. See id. § 57-3-101 (defining "alcoholic beverage" to include "alcohol, spirits, liquor, [and]
wine" other than beer; "under discussion for amendment as of April 2007); id. § 57-3-406
(prohibiting the retail sale of "alcoholic beverages" between eleven p.m. on Saturday and eight
a.m. on Monday).
223. See Fresh Thinking on Sunday Sales, MEMPHIS COM. APPEAL, Dec. 11, 2005, at V6
(explaining that liquor is not sold in Tennessee on Sunday because of the lobbying pressure of
liquor wholesalers, who see the system as keeping prices high, and beer distributors, who like
reduced competition).
224. Such interference with the marketplace is why many free-market economists oppose
blue laws. See JOHNS, supra note 16, at 217 (explaining that "the arbitrary restraint on
commerce and competition demanded by Sunday-observance laws mock free enterprise");
LABAND & HEINBUCH, supra note 1, at 4 (explaining that Laband, as a free-market economist,
had to overcome his own bias towards blue laws because of their interference with the
marketplace).
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2. Nowhere Else to Turn: The Lack of a Secular Legislative Purpose
Without the support of recreation-related exemptions, there is
little evidence to contradict the overtly religious purpose of modern
Sunday restrictions. For instance, many blue laws still refer to
225
Sunday as the "Lord's Day," including Maine and New Hampshire.
New York calls Sunday the "Sabbath," a day it claims "general consent
set apart for rest and religious uses." 226 Similarly, under a section of
its laws entitled "Sunday to be observed," Oklahoma states that
because "very general consent set[s] apart" Sunday "for rest and
religious uses, the law forbids on that day certain acts deemed useless
and serious interruptions of the repose and religious liberty of the
community." 227 Both New York and Oklahoma refer to blue law
violations as "Sabbath-breaking." 228 In Two Guys from HarrisonAllentown, Inc. v. McGinley, the Supreme Court dismissed similar
language in Pennsylvania's blue laws as "the result of legislative
oversight in failing to remove" the provisions. 229 However, it is
unlikely that the legislature has continued to overlook this religious
language for thirty years, especially given the existence of a Supreme
Court opinion pointing it out.
Beyond containing blatant religious references, modern blue
laws also frequently prohibit solely recreational activities. For
example, while the statutes at issue in McGowan v. Maryland
permitted sports like car racing and pool, 230 modern blue laws in
Tennessee 23 1 and Pennsylvania 2 2 expressly restrict them. Additional
activities that would otherwise increase Sunday's recreational
character are also limited in many states, including horse and dog
racing; 23 3 tennis, baseball, football, and polo; 2 34 hunting;235 and

225. See ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 3201 (2006) (defining the "Lord's Day" to include "the
time between 12 o'clock on Saturday night and 12 o'clock on Sunday night" in a subchapter
entitled "Holy Days"); N.H, REV. STAT. ANN. § 332-D:1 (2006) (prohibiting "work, business, or
labor.., on the first day of the week commonly called the Lord's Day").
226. See N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 2 (McKinney 2007) (explaining why activities are prohibited
on "[tihe first day of the week" in a section entitled "The Sabbath"; under discussion for
amendment as of April 2007).
227. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 907 (2007).
228. Id.; N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 3 (McKinney 2007).
229. Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582, 594 (1961).
230. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 424 (1961).
231. See TENN. CODE ANN. § 55-22-109 (2006) (forbidding automobile racing on Sunday
unless it occurs after noon).
232. See 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7105 (West 2006) (prohibiting operation of public pool or
billiard rooms on Sunday unless in a city of the first class, when the establishment can open
after one p.m.).

233. See supra notes 37, 39 and accompanying text.

1302

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 60:4:1273

bingo. 236 Little explanation exists for banning such recreational
activities on what is allegedly a day of rest other than encouraging
237
church attendance, a fact acknowledged by the Court in Two Guys.
Similarly, Sunday restrictions that only apply to the first half of the
day exhibit no connection to recreation but instead seem solely
directed at prohibiting activities that might otherwise interfere with
238
morning church services.
Finally, the prevalence of blue laws directed at activities
considered by most Christian sects to be "immoral" suggests the
purpose of Sunday prohibitions is a religious one. The clearest
examples are alcohol restrictions. There would be little disagreement
that consuming alcohol is a recreational activity; however, whether it
is a morally appropriate one is subject to argument. Similarly, horse
and dog racing, games of chance, and the operation of pawnbrokers
are all activities thought by many to be morally corrupt.
Consequently, they are frequently the subject of blue law prohibitions.
In deciding to create such restrictions, it appears states have
reached a compromise: instead of totally banning activities disliked by
the religious majority, they simply prohibit them on Sunday. Again,
the wisdom of this choice is not in question. However, its
constitutionality is highly suspect. As shown in McGowan v.
Maryland, the validity of blue laws under the Establishment Clause
depends heavily on their purpose. 239 Modern blue laws, however,
exhibit no evidence that they were enacted to create a common day of

234. See 4 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 82, 152, 182 (West 2006) (prohibiting (1) baseball or
football between two p.m. and six p.m. on Sunday unless approved by voters in the effected
municipality, (2) polo before one p.m. if voters in the effected municipality voted against allowing
it, and (3) tennis games that charge admission before one p.m. regardless of what the effected
municipality wants).
235. See supra note 40 and accompanying text.
236. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
237. See Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc. v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582, 595 (1961)
(explaining that allowing recreational exercises on Sunday is inconsistent with aiding church
attendance).
238. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 436.165 (West 2006) (allowing municipalities to regulate
retail sales on Sunday as long as those sales do not occur between six a.m. and noon); MICH.
COMP. LAWS § 436.2113 (2007) (providing that a county legislative body or municipality by
referendum can allow "spirits and mixed spirit drink" to be sold on Sunday for on-site
consumption, presuming such consumption occurs after noon); NEB. REV. STAT. § 53-179 (2006)
(allowing a city or county to permit the sale of liquor on Sunday, but not between six a.m. and
noon); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.1-30-01 to 12.1-30-02 (2005) (making it a misdemeanor to "conduct
business or labor for profit" or sale or rent a specific list of items before noon on Sunday); S.C.
CODE ANN. §§ 53-1-5, 53-1-40, 53-1-60 (2006) (deeming it "unlawful for any person to engage in
worldly work, labor, business of his ordinary calling or the selling ... to the consumer any goods,
wares, or merchandise ... excepting work of necessity or charity" before one-thirty p.m. on
Sundays).
239. See discussion supra Part III.A.
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rest. Instead, they employ religious terminology, prohibit recreational
activities, and offer exemptions not to create an "atmosphere of
recreation" but to appease special interest groups. These factors
suggest that, unlike the Court held in McGowan, blue laws were never
intended to create a day of rest. Rather, the passage of time has
revealed states' true motives: to ensure that the Christian Sabbath
remains holy, at least until so doing affects their pocketbooks. Such a
purpose is far from secular. As a result, a challenge to modern blue
laws would fail the Lemon and endorsement tests.
B. The Effect of Modern Blue Laws
In order to determine the constitutionality of blue laws, it is
necessary not only to examine their purpose but also their effect, a
central element in all three Establishment Clause analyses. Under the
Lemon and endorsement tests, the effect of a government action can
neither advance nor endorse religion, 240 while the coercion test
requires that no one be coerced into supporting or participating in a
religious exercise. 241 However, modern blue laws do both.
If examined under either the Lemon or endorsement tests, the
unconstitutionality of Sunday restrictions is readily apparent. By
prohibiting otherwise legal activities only on the Christian Sabbath,
states are effectively placing their stamp of endorsement on one set of
religious beliefs. As Justice Douglas asked in his McGowan dissent,
why not ban all work on Saturday? 242 Such a choice would
undoubtedly provide citizens with a uniform day of rest; however, it
would also conflict with the Christian majority's belief that Sunday is
the appropriate Sabbath. Moreover, by decreasing the number of
activities available to compete with church services for participants,
blue laws advance the religious goal of encouraging church
attendance. Therefore, even though blue laws need not fail both the
purpose and effect prongs of the Lemon and endorsement tests to be
invalid establishments of religion, 243 they do just that.
Surprisingly, blue laws' unconstitutionality seems equally as
certain when examined under the coercion test. In Lee v. Weisman, the
Supreme Court found prayer at a public school graduation
unconstitutionally coercive since students were pressured to stand or

240. See discussion supra Part III.B.1-2.
241. See discussion supra Part III.B.3.
242. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 565 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
243. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 690 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (explaining
that "an affirmative answer to either [Lemon's purpose or effect inquires] should render the
challenged practice invalid" when applying the endorsement test).
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"maintain respectful silence. '244 When states ban activities on Sunday
that might compete with churches for participation, they are exerting
a similar pressure on citizens to attend Christian religious services.
Moreover, blue laws can be characterized as much more than mere
pressure; they actually force businesses and citizens to observe the
Christian Sabbath by not participating in certain otherwise legal
activities. True, no states have expressly mandated that citizens
attend a church service, but such is not required for blue laws to
violate the Establishment Clause. Instead, the government's action
'245
must only coerce someone "to participate in religion or its exercise.
The Christian Sabbath is defined by the Fourth Commandment as a
"day of rest" on which "no one in [the] household may do any kind of
work. ' 246 By using blue laws to prohibit non-recreational activities on
Sunday, states are effectively requiring their citizens to observe their
own "day of rest." This mandated inaction could be interpreted as a
religious observance when the state demands that it occur on Sunday,
the Christian Sabbath. Therefore, in enacting and maintaining blue
laws, states are requiring their citizens to participate in a religious
exercise, a clear violation of the coercion test.
As shown by the discussion above, modern blue laws fail each
of the Supreme Court's three Establishment Clause tests.
Consequently, exactly which framework the Court might use to
determine the constitutionality of blue laws is somewhat irrelevant.
Regardless of the test employed, the result will be the same: Sunday
closing laws violate the Establishment Clause and should be
invalidated accordingly.
V. CONCLUSION

America is a predominantly Christian nation. As such,
legislative policies often represent the desires of the Christian
majority, a fact no better illustrated than in the continued existence of
Sunday closing laws. 247 However, the Establishment Clause was
meant to protect citizens "against any law which selects any religious
custom, practice, or ritual, puts the force of government behind it, and
fines, imprisons, or otherwise penalizes a person for not observing
it. '' 248 Regardless of the analysis applied, modern blue laws cannot be
found consistent with such a requirement.
244. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992); see also discussion supra Part III.B.3.
245. Lee, 505 U.S. at 587.
246. Exodus 20:8-10.
247. See Stadtmauer, supra note 121, at 214 (stating that "[flew laws illustrate the
contention that America is a Christian nation more vividly than the 'Blue Laws").
248. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 564 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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Nonetheless, even when looking beyond the general purpose of
the Establishment Clause to the specific tests employed by the
Supreme Court, blue laws cannot withstand constitutional challenge.
As evidenced by the litany of exceptions states have granted for
entirely economic purposes, modern blue laws have little concern with
the secular goal of creating a day of rest. If such were the legislature's
true purpose, it could have just as easily enacted a "one-day-in-seven
law," guaranteeing all employees one day of work off a week but
leaving the choice of day up to the individual. Such statutes are
already employed in some states, including Texas, which requires that
no retail employer may "deny an employee at least one period of 24
consecutive hours of time off for rest or worship in each seven-day
period." 24 9 While one-day-in-seven laws would promote an atmosphere
of recreation and encourage a more productive work force, they would
not force employees to observe a particular religion's Sabbath.
However, as the Court pointed out in McGowan v. Maryland,
one-day-in-seven laws do not create a uniform day of rest, "a day
which all members of the family and community have the opportunity
to spend and enjoy together [in] ...relative quiet and dissociation
activities." 250
of commercial
everyday intensity
the
from
Unfortunately, neither do modern blue laws. With their vast
exemptions and inconsistent application, Sunday restrictions require
that many members of the community work on Sunday even while
forbidding their neighbors and family members from doing so.
Certainly, this can be no more of a "uniform" day of rest than that
provided by a one-day-in-seven law. The existence of such an
alternative measure through which to create a day of rest only further
emphasizes the legislature's true motive in enacting blue laws: "to
25 1
observe the Sabbath day by keeping it holy."

249. TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 52.001 (Veron 2006).
250. McGowan, 366 U.S. at 450.
251. Exodus 20:8.
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When concluding its opinion in McGowan, the Court
emphasized the limited nature of its holding. It stated, "[flinally, we
should make clear that this case deals only with the constitutionality
of ....the Maryland statute before us. We do not hold that Sunday
legislation may not be a violation of the 'Establishment' Clause if it
can be demonstrated that its purpose ...is to use the State's coercive
power to aid religion." 252 As this Note has argued, such a
demonstration can be made today. Given the changes that Sunday
restrictions have undergone since 1961 and the Supreme Court's own
evolving Establishment Clause jurisprudence, it is clear that the time
has come to reevaluate the constitutionality of blue laws.
Lesley Lawrence-Hammer*

252. McGowan, 366 U.S. at 453.
*
Thank you to my husband, Brad, for all his understanding and support.

